More on the Mac, Judging Mac Sales, Assessing Mac Success
Hello everyone. It feels good to be back in the swing of things.
As it turned out, the OpenAI saga reached something of a temporary lull right before Thanksgiving last week. Sam Altman was reinstated as CEO but with a new board not of his preference (Adam D'Angelo, Larry Summers, Bret Taylor). In going back over last Monday’s update, there isn’t much that needs to be changed or updated. Some of the latest reporting, which appears to be accurate, had Altman recently trying (unsuccessfully) to make inroads in gaining board control. Such action would likely have played a role in the subsequent boardroom drama. As we discussed, the “we are moving to Microsoft” development was then a negotiation tactic on Altman’s part. If there are any new twists and turns that jump out at me, we will revisit the subject.
Two quick notes:
Last week, a new Above Avalon Report, "The State of the Mac," was published. As a reminder, an audio version of the report was also recorded and released to members with the podcast add-on attached to their membership. To get the add-on, fill out this form.
Above Avalon Gifts will go live on Monday, December 4th. More information will be available at that time.
Today’s update will cover some of the member feedback and questions that came in about the report.
More on the Mac
For the past 18 to 24 months, Mac and iPad results have led to some head-scratching.
Revenue growth rates for both product categories have been all over the place. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, it may be difficult to make sense of it all. Supply interruptions, combined with channel inventory shifts and different product launch timing have added noise to the mix. However, looking at unit sales on an annual basis, things become clearer to see. iPad unit sales were down 7% in 2023 (my estimate) while Mac unit sales were down an adjusted 10% or so (my estimate). Actual Mac unit sales were down closer to 25% due to one-time issues at the end of FY2022 / start of FY2023.
In what will likely catch many people off guard, Mac unit sales in 2023 were at the same level as they were in the mid-2010s, years before the Apple Silicon transition. Even after we adjust sales to reflect one-time factors, we are looking at a sales run rate that is just 10% higher than 2014 to 2017 sales. This leads to an obvious question: Why hasn’t Apple Silicon led to stronger Mac sales?
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Above Avalon Podcast Episode 176: The Mac Earned a Diploma
The Mac is seeing momentum by being true to itself instead of trying to be something that it’s not. With a transition to Apple Silicon, the product category is now benefiting from lessons Apple learned from more popular devices aimed at the mass market. As the Above Avalon podcast enters its seventh season, episode 176 is dedicated to discussing the Mac’s Apple Silicon and what may come next for the Mac. Additional topics include the Apple Silicon transition being akin to a graduation for the Mac, the Apple Innovation Feedback Loop, and overlap between the iPad Pro and Mac portables.
To listen to episode 176, go here.
The complete Above Avalon podcast episode archive is available here.
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Apple's Ecosystem Growth Is Accelerating
The two most recent Above Avalon articles took a look at how and why Apple’s ecosystem is giving the company a major advantage against the competition.
With Apple reporting 3Q20 earnings two weeks ago, there is value in quantifying how much Apple’s ecosystem is growing. The data should startle the competition. Apple is seeing a clear acceleration in its ecosystem growth as hundreds of millions of iPhone-only users move deeper into the Apple fold by subscribing to various services and buying additional products.
Measuring Ecosystem Growth
There are a number of ways one can attempt to track or measure Apple’s ecosystem growth.
Number of devices per user
Number of paid subscriptions per user
In covering Apple’s business from a financial perspective, my modeling work includes keeping up-to-date estimates for most of the preceding data points. However, there is one metric missing from the list that may come as a surprise: overall revenue. Considering Apple provides this data point every three months, such an exclusion may seem peculiar. Wouldn’t Apple revenue shed light on how the Apple ecosystem is performing?
Relying on overall revenue for analyzing Apple’s ecosystem growth will lead to faulty conclusions. In Exhibit 1, Apple’s revenue is graphed on a trailing twelve months (TTM) basis. This is done to smooth out the seasonality found in Apple’s business (i.e. sales are concentrated around the holidays). The takeaway from the exhibit is that higher revenue demonstrates Apple’s ecosystem continues to grow although the rate of growth has slowed dramatically.
There is one problem with such a takeaway: It’s wrong.
Exhibit 1: Apple Revenue (TTM)
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
Overall revenue trends are masking what is actually occurring with Apple’s ecosystem. In FY2019, the iPhone was responsible for 55% of Apple’s overall revenue. On its own, that’s not an issue for Apple. The iPhone is part of Apple’s ecosystem after all. However, Apple has become increasingly dependent on existing users upgrading their devices to generate iPhone revenue. This has resulted in Apple’s overall revenue being heavily influenced by iPhone upgrading trends.
During periods of robust iPhone upgrading, Apple’s overall revenue shows stronger growth. When iPhone upgrading slows, overall revenue growth also slows to the point that Apple’s ecosystem may appear to be plateauing or even contracting (as seen in Exhibit 1). This was a major issue at the end of 2018 and early 2019 as slowing iPhone upgrades led many to conclude that Apple was in big trouble in China and other geographies.
Since iPhone upgrading trends have little to no direct impact on Apple ecosystem viability or strength, a better approach to get insights on Apple’s ecosystem growth is to divide Apple’s revenue into two categories:
iPhone
non-iPhone (Services, Mac, iPad, Wearables, Home, and Accessories)
As seen in Exhibit 2, breaking Apple’s overall revenue into iPhone and non-iPhone revenue leads to a completely different view of Apple’s growth trajectory. Non-iPhone revenue (the red line) continues to demonstrate very strong momentum while iPhone revenue (the blue line) is trending at the same level that it was in 2015.
Exhibit 2: Revenue (iPhone vs. Non-iPhone) - TTM
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
A different way of looking at this data is to consider revenue growth rates. Using the revenue figures from Exhibit 2, we are able to create Exhibit 3, which displays year-over-year change in revenue for both iPhone and non-iPhone.
Non-iPhone revenue growth (the red line) has outpaced iPhone revenue growth (the blue line) for the past seven quarters. The higher growth rates for iPhone revenue in 2018 were due to higher iPhone ASPs caused by Apple unveiling the iPhone X. Excluding those quarters, non-iPhone revenue growth has been trending stronger than iPhone growth since 2016. This is a sign that Apple’s underlying ecosystem strength has been gaining momentum for years - it’s just been masked by people holding on to their iPhones for longer before upgrading.
Exhibit 3: Revenue Growth YOY (iPhone vs. Non-iPhone) - TTM
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
What is driving the non-iPhone revenue strength shown in Exhibits 2 and 3? The answer is found in the strong iPhone revenue trends from a few years ago. Years of strong new user growth driven by the iPhone is now contributing to hundreds of millions of iPhone-only users moving deeper into the Apple ecosystem. This trend began in earnest around the beginning of 2017.
The Services Myth
Some may look at the preceding exhibits and say that the data is still incomplete. Apple Services include a number of recurring revenue streams such as iCloud, Apple Music, and various paid subscriptions. Given the recurring nature of something like paid iCloud storage, it ends up being easier for Apple to report year-over-year Services growth. Apple’s Services business accounts for 40% of non-iPhone revenue. There is a different dynamic found with hardware revenue. Since hardware isn’t a recurring revenue stream, year-over-year growth ends up being that much harder to achieve as Apple is in effect needing to replace every dollar of revenue with new sales.
(One can argue something like the iPhone Upgrade Program is a recurring revenue stream for hardware. However, that ends up being a stretch. The Upgrade Program is a loan with a built-in upgrade optionality after the 12th payment. That is very different than something like an iCloud or Apple Music subscription.)
To address this issue, non-iPhone revenue can be broken out into Services and Products (excluding iPhone). In what will come as a shock to many people, Exhibits 4 and 5 show how Products revenue excluding iPhone (i.e. iPad, Mac, Wearables, Home, and Accessories) is now growing at nearly the same pace as Services. This represents a major narrative violation as consensus spent years positioning Services as Apple’s growth engine.
Exhibit 4: Revenue (Apple Services vs. Apple Products Excluding iPhone) - TTM
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
Exhibit 5: Revenue Growth YOY (Apple Services vs. Apple Products Excluding iPhone) - TTM
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
Based on Apple management commentary, we know that upgrading is not impacting the iPad, Mac, and wearables as much as the iPhone. Approximately half of people buying iPads and Macs are new to the product categories. For Apple Watch, the percentage is more than 75%. The new user percentage for iPhone sales is a fraction of those percentages. This tells us that iPad, Mac, and wearables sales are a very good indicator of Apple ecosystem strength.
Tying It All Together
One way of thinking about the Apple ecosystem is to view it as a pie. There are two ways for Apple to expand the pie: Bring in more customers and have existing customers spend more on services and products in the ecosystem (higher ARPU).
New users entering the ecosystem - The iPhone SE should not be underestimated as a successful tool for bringing Android users into the Apple fold.
Existing users moving deeper into the ecosystem - iPhone users are buying iPads, Macs, and wearables as well as subscribing to various Apple services.
Apple currently finds itself in an ecosystem expansion phase. Hundreds of millions of people with only one Apple device - an iPhone - are embarking on a search for more Apple experiences. We see this with non-iPhone revenue growing by 14% in 3Q20 on a TTM basis, which is higher than growth rates seen in the mid-2010s, as seen in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6: Apple Non-iPhone Revenue Growth Projection
Click / tap exhibit to enlarge.
Looking ahead, my estimates have non-iPhone revenue accelerating from 14% growth to 20% growth in the coming quarters. iPad, Mac, and wearables are a major source of that growth acceleration. Considering how Apple is working off of a much larger revenue base, for revenue growth percentages to actually increase this far along in the process is intriguing. The takeaway is that Apple’s ecosystem is gaining momentum at a pace that should frighten the competition.
Hundreds of millions of people will be buying their first Apple wearable device in the coming years. Given the inherent nature of wearable devices - new form factors designed to make technology more personal - it is very likely that one Apple wearable purchase will eventually lead to additional Apple wearable purchases. Apple can then leverage high-margin Services to run with more aggressive pricing on wearables (and other Apple devices) which only ends up boosting demand.
Listen to the corresponding Above Avalon podcast episode for this article here.
Receive my analysis and perspective on Apple throughout the week via exclusive daily updates (2-3 stories per day, 10-12 stories per week). Available to Above Avalon members in both written and audio forms. To sign up and for more information on membership, visit the membership page.
For additional discussion on this topic, check out the Above Avalon daily update from August 13th.
Apple's Product Strategy Is Changing
This year’s WWDC felt different. While every WWDC keynote is filled to the brim with new features, this year’s announcements included highly anticipated items like a new Mac Pro and differentiated iPad software features. In addition, there were some genuine surprises such as SwiftUI (a big deal with wide-ranging implications for Apple’s ecosystem). Despite there being no discernible change to the grand vision behind Apple’s product development, there does appear to be a noteworthy change to strategy.
The Past
Apple had been following a product strategy that can be thought of as a pull system. The company was most aggressive with the products capable of making technology more relevant and personal.
One way of conceptualizing this product strategy is to think of every major Apple product category being attached to a rope. The order in which these products were attached to the rope was determined by the degree to which technology was made more personal via new workflows and processes for getting work done. Accordingly, Apple Watch and iPhone were located on the end of the rope held by Apple management. Meanwhile, Mac desktops were located at the other end of the rope while iPads and Mac portables were somewhere in the middle.
As Apple management pulled on the rope, the Apple Watch and iPhone received much of the attention while the Mac increasingly resembled dead weight.
The preceding exhibit may make it seem like all of Apple’s product categories moved in sync with each other as Apple management pulled on the product “rope.” In reality, the quicker Apple pulled on the rope, the more chaotic the end of the rope moved. The following exhibit does a better job of demonstrating the chaos found at the end of the rope.
The Apple Watch and iPhone were Apple’s clear priorities while the iPad, Mac portables, and Mac desktops ended up facing a battle for management attention. The iPad seemed to have the clear advantage in that battle, at least when it came to capturing mindshare among Apple’s senior ranks. Recall Tim Cook’s comment about the iPad being the clearest expression of Apple’s vision of the future of personal computing.
Today
Over the past two years, we received clues that a major change was beginning to take hold in Apple’s product strategy. This change was on display during this year’s WWDC. Consider the following announcements:
The Apple Watch continues to gradually gain independence from iOS and the iPhone with its own App Store and the ability to create watchOS apps without an iPhone app.
iPadOS is a promise from Apple that iPad will be given unique software features versus iPhone. Features like multitasking and Apple Pencil support give iPad differentiation from its more popular sibling (iPhone).
The new Mac Pro is clear evidence of Apple industrial design, along with the engineering and product design teams, attempting to come up with a long-term solution for the most powerful computer in the product line.
SwiftUI is the kind of foundation Apple needs to properly leverage a thriving iOS developer ecosystem in order to benefit other product categories.
Apple no longer appears to be relying so much on a pull system when it comes to advancing its product line. Instead, a push system is being utilized, and every major product category is being pushed forward simultaneously. The change was designed to reduce the amount of chaos found at the end of the “rope” that Apple was pulling. Accordingly, the primary benefactors arising from this new strategy are the iPad and Mac. This explains why this year’s WWDC announcements felt more overwhelming than those of previous years. Apple was able to move its entire product category forward at the same time.
This revised strategy ends up supporting a core tenet of my Grand Unified Theory of Apple Products - a product category's design is tied to the role it is meant to play relative to other Apple products. (A deep dive into Apple’s product vision and the Grand Unified Theory of Apple Products is available here for Above Avalon members.) By pushing the products geared towards handling the most demanding workflows, Apple has a greater incentive to push the products capable of making technology more personal and relevant.
It’s not that every product category in Apple’s line is now on equal footing in terms of importance and focus. Some products will receive updates every few years while others require more attention due to needing annual updates. In addition, Apple’s revised product strategy likely won’t change the sales ratios between product categories (iPhone outselling iPad by four times while iPad outsells Mac by more than two to one). Instead, the change from a pull to push system manifests itself with each product category being given a defined and unique role to handle within the Apple ecosystem.
Wearables are tasked with handling entirely new workflows in addition to a growing number of workflows that had been given to iPhones and iPads.
The iPhone is the most powerful camera and video player in our lives.
iPads and Macs are content creation tools.
Implications
There are a number of product-related implications arising from Apple’s revised strategy:
Mac Desktops. Despite being in the post-PC era, desktops are experiencing some kind of renaissance. Some of this isn’t entirely surprising given how the desktop has always been viewed as an antidote to some of the ideals found with mobile. However, what is new is the realization of the desktop’s role in the AR era. Mac desktops are niche in terms of the number of users relative to other Apple product categories, albeit a very powerful and crucial niche.
Mac Portables. It is time to take Apple management at its word when it says the Mac is important to Apple’s future. Mac portables will likely retain a place in Apple’s product line for the foreseeable future. A few years ago, low-end Mac portables seemed to be on a dead-end path thanks to iPads. There is no longer any evidence that such thinking is widely held in Apple’s senior ranks. An ARM-based Mac portable seems inevitable at this point.
iPad. Just a few years ago, some in the tech pundit world thought the iPad lacked a future. Such thinking was due to slowing iPad sales combined with larger iPhones being able to handle many of the use cases originally given to iPad. While the iPad has always been viewed as the future of computing within Apple, we are starting to see that vision materialize. iPad sales are now routinely surprising to the upside as Apple adds a “pro” layer to the iPad category in terms of powerful hardware and software.
iPhone. The iPhone as a product category continues to mature, as seen with a longer upgrade cycle. Going forward, the iPhone will primarily be known as the most powerful camera in our lives and a video consumption device. Many of the less intensive use cases and workflows currently given to the iPhone will naturally flow to wearables over time.
Wearables. Apple is the wearables leader. Fitbit would arguably be the closest from the perspective of unit sales but even then, the company is quickly losing momentum. Lessons that Apple learned with iPhone and iPad are now giving the company a wearables advantage that is likely at least five years. An independent Apple Watch not requiring an iPhone to set up is inevitable. The move would increase Apple Watch’s addressable market by three times overnight. In addition, Apple is well on its way to establishing a wearables platform as it competes for prime real estate on our wrists, in our ears, and in front of our eyes.
Will It Work?
Is Apple making the right product strategy decision moving from a pull to push system? It’s too early to tell. At first, the revised strategy may seem like a no brainer as each product category ends up benefitting from more attention. However, it’s not a given that such a dynamic is in Apple’s best long-term interests.
The source of my hesitation in Apple’s new product strategy is that the company’s long-term success is dependent on one item: making technology more personal. Anything that takes away from that goal ends up being a hurdle. Is Apple supporting legacy workflows to the detriment of Apple’s long-standing mission of making technology more personal and relevant?
One reason Apple decided to change product strategies in the first place was to avoid an all-out uprising among the 1% of the user base creating content consumed by the other 99%. The mistake Apple made over the past few years was pulling the product “rope” too fast and in the process, leaving many of its pro users, defined by the workflows needed to be supported, behind.
For a company that is resource constrained when it comes to time and attention, there is no guarantee that Apple’s functional organizational structure and design-led culture can realistically scale to push an endless number of product categories at the same time. This was the key benefit found with Apple’s pull system. The focus was to advance the products capable of making technology more personal and relevant while trying to bring as much of the broader product portfolio along for the ride. The move to a push system is inherently more complex. Apple finds itself doing a whole lot more that it did just a few years ago.
Some will push back at the claim that Apple is resource constrained considering the company has $113 billion of net cash on the balance sheet. However, such a view doesn’t take into account how Apple functions. Apple could have thrown together some components in a big box and shipped a new Mac Pro shortly after realizing that the previous Mac Pro design was a dead end. Instead, Apple’s industrial designers, working in close collaboration with various teams, took a little over two and a half years to come up with what is marketed as a long-term solution for handling the most demanding content creation workflows. Similar questions now plague Apple pertaining to its approach to “pro” Mac portables.
My concerns regarding Apple’s revised product strategy would be alleviated if Apple came up with a plan to push legacy platforms forward by doubling down on future initiatives involving making technology more personal. This is why SwiftUI is intriguing. Apple is positioning SwiftUI as a way to improve a developer's productivity by requiring less code, resulting in better code. What if that is only scratching the surface as to Apple’s ultimate objective? What if the Mac is being repositioned as an AR creation platform while iOS is gradually positioned as a platform for developing wearables apps? Using a billion iPhones to develop apps consumed on billions of wearable devices is the type of goal that would require years of work, foundation building, and periodic changes to product strategy.
Receive my analysis and perspective on Apple throughout the week via exclusive daily updates (2-3 stories per day, 10-12 stories per week). Available to Above Avalon members. To sign up and for more information on membership, visit the membership page.